lunes, 9 de mayo de 2016

La comunidad de hablantes. PETER L. Patrick.

Sociolingüística tema »Idioma Variación y cambio.

La comunidad de hablantes (SPCOM), un concepto central en la lingüística empíricos, es la intersección de muchos
principales problemas en la teoría sociolingüística y el método. Trazo su historia de desarrollo y
divergencia, estudiar los problemas generales con las nociones contemporáneas, y discutir enlaces a temas clave en
la investigación de la variación lingüística y el cambio. Yo tampoco ofrecen una nueva y correcta definición ni el rechazo
(concepto de ambos esfuerzos equivocados), ni forma exhaustiva estudiar sus aplicaciones en el campo (un imposiblemente
gran tarea).
1 Problemas generales con el habla como un concepto
Cada rama de la lingüística que se ocupa de muestras representativas de una población; eso toma
altavoces individuales o sujetos experimentales como miembros típicos de un grupo; que estudia como lengua
atribuible a un cuerpo social coherente (si es o no profesa interés en la naturaleza social de
ese cuerpo); o bien toma como primitivas nociones tales como "nativo", "competencia / rendimiento"
"Aceptabilidad", etc., que manifiestamente se refiere a un comportamiento colectivo, se basa parcialmente en un concepto
equivalente a la SPCOM. sistemas lingüísticos son ejercidos por los altavoces, en el espacio social: ahí están
adquirida, el cambio, son manipulados con fines expresivos o comunicativa que se someten a desgaste, etc.
Ya sea lingüistas prefieren centrarse en los altavoces, variedades o gramáticas, el problema de relacionar una
sistema lingüístico de sus hablantes no es trivial.
En el estudio de cambio de idioma y la variación (geográfica o social), la referencia a la SPCOM es
ineludible, sin embargo, hay muy poco acuerdo o discusión teórica del concepto de
la sociolingüística, aunque a menudo se ha definido. Algunos ejemplos de informes de investigación sugieren la
grado de su extensión (sobre) (Williams 1992: 71).
El término "SPCOM" se ha utilizado para las comunidades urbanas geográficamente delimitadas, tanto grandes
(Filadelfia; Labov 1989) y pequeñas (Anniston, Alabama; Feagin 1996); para las zonas urbanas
( "Veeton" en Kingston, Jamaica; Patrick 1999) y subgrupos Belfast-hablantes vernáculos (Milroy y
Margrain 1980, pero ver a Macaulay 1997: 15) y "la minoría francófona de Ontario,
Canadá "(Mougeon y Beniak 1996: 69). Se ha negado a otras ciudades (Londres; Wardhaugh
1998: 123) sino que se utiliza para la Inglaterra anglosajona (Labov, 1982: 35), para los inmigrantes urbanos, a diferencia
tanto desde su origen y grupos destinatarios (Kerswill 1994), y para la "unidad nacional de un
pueblo "(Dittmar, 1976: 106). Cortar a través de líneas geográficas y de clase, se ha utilizado de muy
ensamblajes generales, tales como niños (Romaine 1982: 7) y mujeres (Coates 1993: 140), así como
las específicas y temporales, como los miembros de ajury (Durant 1999).
Para las poblaciones rurales, se ha utilizado para seleccionar los asentamientos con nombre de altavoces warlpiri (Bavin
1989), sino también para una discontinua, más grande región-la-Caeltacht en Irlanda (Watson 1989) donde


altavoces no definen sus comunidades en términos lingüísticos. Joly (1 981) denomina la afrohispana
population of Panama's Costa Abajo both a SpCom and a "ritual community." Dimmendaal (1989) uses SpCom for the Turkana in Kenya, who have absorbed a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups (with consequent language loss) and undergone significant dialect differentiation. The famously complex case of Eastern Tukanoan language speakers in the Vaupes region of Amazonia, where each
patrilineal exogamic group is ideally identified by language but "one does not marry someone who speaks one's own language" (Gomez-Imbert 1996: 442), is analyzed as a SpCom by Jackson (1974: 55) but not by Gomez-Imbert.
In textbooks the SpCom is ignored surprisingly often (Chambers and Trudgill 1980, Chambers 1995, Downes 1998, Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 1998, Trudgill 2000). Elsewhere it is considered too difficult to explore (Fasold 1984: 44), or treated narrowly within a single paradigm, usually ethnographic (Fasold 1990, Romaine 1994, Salzmann 1998), with contrasting approaches briefly outlined but not pursued.
Occasionally the SpCom is seriously treated, but with no positive resolution of difficulties. Hudson (1996) compares several major definitions but, starting from the premise that language is an individual possession, takes a radical subjectivist view that ends by entirely dismissing the utility of the concept. Wardhaugh (1998) similarly develops the idea from idealized homogeneity to fragmented individualism, with community dependent upon the impulse to identify oneself with others. Instead of rejection he prefers a vague, one-size-fits-all approach: "some kind of social group whose speech characteristics are of interest and can be described in a coherent manner" (1998: 116). More helpfully, but equally radically, Duranti (1997) recommends abandoning the SpCom as "an already constituted object of inquiry," instead taking it as an analytical perspective: "the product of the communicative activities engaged in by a given group of people" (1997: 82). Despite this trend towards rejection, the SpCom is still referred to by most researchers as though it were either unproblematic or, at any rate, necessary.
This partial review suggests a general lack of analysis and synthesis concerning the SpCom; the next section considers more thoughtful treatments. Reading the history of this concept, one is struck by the programmatic character of the chief sociolinguistic definitions. Many influential ones were advanced early in the field's development-formulated in the 1960s and refined in the 1970s-perhaps as signposts staking out territories their proponents wished to pursue. Based on a few early studies (e.g. Labov in NYC, Gumperz in India), they reflect the concerns of each researcher-multilingualism for Gumperz, linguistic evaluation and style-shifting for Labov, ways of speaking and communicative competence for Hymes-to the relative exclusion of other emphases. As practitioners developing an idea for use in their own projects, each created a contingent concept, later retooled for general use.
This retrospective view exaggerates: convergences did occur, notably between Hymes and Gumperz. Yet when each new conception is introduced, one finds little or no reference to existing ones: Gumperz is not concerned with stratification, or Labov with shared communicative patterns across language areas, while Hymes discusses interactional criteria only with reference to Bloomfield, not Gumperz. Clearly, definitions were not developed on the basis of any taxonomy of case studies or survey of existing work.
Despite general early concern for the classification of sociolinguistic situations (Weinreich 1953, Ferguson 1959, 1966, Stewart 1962, Hymes 1972) and Hymes's statement that "The natural unit for sociolinguistic taxonomy ... is not the language but the speech community" (1972: 43), apparently no such enterprise has formed the basis for examination and empirical development of the speech community concept. Indeed, the taxonomic enterprise itself has languished or perhaps been abandoned: we have nothing equivalent to anthropology's cross-cultural Human Relations Area Files. Though comparative studies flourish in specific areas (urban dialectology, dialect contact, language attrition), overall profiles and general models are lacking, such as attempts to analyze speech communities holistically as sociolinguistic systems and then typologize them (Trudgill, this volume).
A good deal of theorizing in a young, expanding field is polemical in nature. Common external targets have been structuralists' reduction of the speech community to a mere extension of a linguistic system (Hymes 1972: 54), and Chomsky's famous "ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community" (1965: 3). Within the field, Labov's (1966) definition has been repeatedly attacked, often by researchers with similar methodological and analytical predilections Such efforts typically identify overly broad claims or narrow restrictions in the original by introducing
new data, and sometimes innovative methods. Often they over- or misinterpret earlier ideas,
maximizing their  unfashionability in the light of recent changes in direction, anchoring a
predecessor's general insight implausibly to  specific associated elements as if to threaten the whole
enterprise, which can then be saved by adopting their innovation. The historical account below
attempts to  sever spurious attachments, in order to enhance our vision both backwards and forwards.
Another  polemical tactic is to claim that sociolinguistic research paradigms are efficiently
encapsulated by their definitions of the SpCom, which  serve as  proximate targets. If the view sketched
here of the concept's development is correct, these brief statements make only partial, often early or
shift ing , s t at ement s of their as sociat ed approaches' basic  princi pies. To t his ext ent, radical attac ks
(or , equally , pro mot ions) mis s thei r mar k unles s t hey look t o pract ice as well  as  prose .
As the  sociolinguistic  research base massively expands, and the oppositional influence of theory
groups and fou nders' ideas (Mu rray 1 996, Figueroa 1 994) perhaps  begins t o recede , discus s io n of t he
SpCom  shift s away fr om t he polemics  of paradig m wars towards cooler engagement with relatively
abstract major issues (but see Bucholtz  1999, a recent attempt to  supplant SpCom with "community
of practice"). One that  has  received considerable attention is the problem of appropriate social
models: the consensus-vs.-conflict debate, stratification, and social class. Two others are not always
carefully distinguished and are  sometimes misguidedly opposed: the problems  of correlation (linking
linguis tic  behavior t o s octal position / st ruct ure) and i ndexicalit y (explaining  how linguis tic forms index
social  meaning) . These are relat ed t o an emphas is  on linguis tic and nor mat ive uniformit y vs.
su bjective identificat ion , and a choice of focus  on institutional power vs. individual agency-and thus
to another issue:  scale, the  size of the group studied and its influence on assumptions, methods, and
interpretation. These are not  new problems for  sociolinguistics, but their interrelationship and
connection to the SpCom needs  clarification.
On ground more familiar to general linguis t s , if equally u ncert ain, two claims  critically underlie classic
definitions: the uniformity of speech by different  speakers, on distinct occasions; and the possibility
of identifying a group of speakers who  share a single language (or conversely, identifying the
boundaries of a language, as  spoken by individuals). Notions  of competence, native-ness, and
language boundaries are too basic and problematic to address here, but the SpCom represents  no
escape from them.
Yet more fundamental issues loom. What  precisely is the  status  of the equation between shared
linguistic  knowledge and  social membership, which most definitions raise? In referring to the SpCom,
are (socio-)linguists assuming that  speakers united by linguistic criteria form a social group? Is this
axiomatic? Are we instead hypothesizing, nominating this as a research question which empirical
studies will  eventually answer? Is it below awareness, an equation made primarily in method, with
unexplored consequences for analysis and interpretation? Confusion on this  point is  rampant, with
the  same author  sometimes implying different positions.
The SpCom is evidently fraught with difficulties. In mixing  social and linguistic issues, matters of fact
and philoso phy, it bring s u s t o the brink of is sues many practici ng  socioli ngui st s feel u nco mfortable
with , per haps even u npre pared to answer . For example , it is  unclear whether  the SpCom is primarily a
social  or Ii nguis tic object (or inhabit s a g round where this dis tinct ion is u nmotivat ed) . Is it appro priate
to build a model using linguistic matter, and then treat it on a par with concepts  like  social group,
network, community of practice-purely social  notions, in the definition of which language plays  no
role? Bucholtz portrays the SpCom as "a language-based unit  of social analysis" (1999:  203) and
complains of the centrality of language, contending that "all  non-linguistic aspects  of social activity
are marginalized or ignored" (1999:  207).  For Hymes, however, the SpCom is  not a naive attempt to
use language to compass a social unit, but rather "an object defined for purposes of linguistic
inquiry", not to be confused with "attributes  of the counterpart  of that object in social life  . . . It
post ulat es t he unit of descri pt ion as a social, rather than linguis tic , ent ity" (1 974: 4 8 , 4 7) .
Ultimately I adopt a similar view, turning around Bucholtz's  phrasing to  see the SpCom as "a socially-
based unit of linguistic analysis", and advocate an approach which addresses the issues implied in
current SpCom definitions  as questions in formulating methodology and interpretations. 
2. History of the Speech Community: Principal Theorists.
The roots  of the concept lie in the general  sources of sociolinguistics: historical linguistics,
philosophy of language, dialectology, anthropology, early structuralism. Tracing "the Humboldtian
(and Herderian)  sources  of [American]  s tr uctu rat linguis tics" (Hymes  and Fought 1 9 81 : 98) t hrough
Boas , Sapir and Whorf reveal s a pers is tent  tin k between co mmunity and language for m. Hymes
charact erizes  a "Herderian model  of one language, one people, one culture, one community-the Hopi
and t heir language , et c ."
(1 974: 1 2 3) , and describes what "Cart esian" and "Herderian" approaches  . . .  have fu ndamentally i n com mon: isolation of a
language as the object of linguistic description; equation of a language with a speech
community (or culture); taking of the social functions of language as external, given,
and universally equivalent.
(Hymes 1 974: 1 20) 
Von Humboldt thought we must "seek the basic explanation of our present-day cultural level in . . .
national intellect ual individual! ties . . . Since t hey [languages] always have a national form, nations as
such are really and directly creat ive" (1 971: 20; see Aarslef f 1 982 against the Herder-via-Hu mboldt
lineage) .
Boas  and  his  students  more cautiously represent  the bond as  complex  and note merely that "all
languages  reflect  the his to ry and cult ure  . . .  of t he community of which t hey have been a part" (Hymes
and Fought 1 981 : 81) . Likewise Sapir , whose Mas ter's thes is invest igat ed Herder's influence on von
Hum boldt, claimed that "S peech . . . is  a pu rely his torical  heri tage of the g roup, the product of long-
co nt inued social u sage" (1 92 1 : 4) . Aft er Boas , he argues early o n and influentially agains t biological
det er minis m, the  tin kage of language change and origins with the progress  and genius of nations and
races: "Language , race and cult ure are  not neces sarily cor related  . . . The coincidences of cleavage
point  merely t o a readily int elligible  hist orical as sociation" (Sapir 1 92 1 : 2 1 5 -1 6) . He grant s  no  si mple
cor porate identit y to the  s peakers of a language variety, and appears  not to use a specific term like
SpCom.
Hymes embraces a basic idea of the "Herderian" approach: "emphasis on language as constituting
cultural ident ity . . .  a met hodology of sympathetic int erpretation of cult Ural diver sit y s ui generi s-
Herder coined t he German verb einfuhlen-if wit hin a larger u niversal  framework" (1 974: 1 20) . (See
Meyerhoff, this volu me; the last  phrase af firm s t he pos sibility of taxono my and comparison , cont ra
Vico.) Hymes cautions that "the focus, however, must be changed from a language as a correlate of a
people, to persons and their ways of s peaking" (1 974: 1 2 3) .
Other ni neteenth centu ry hi st orical Ii ngui st s give the co mmu nity's role  s hort s hrift. Sau s su re  s peaks
only in pas sing of a "community of speakers" in the context  of explanations  for language change.  For
Whi tney (1 979) , individuals i nnovate but  co mmu ni ties  act ually change languages by select ing among
innovatio ns: "Language is  not an i ndividual  posses sion , bu t a social  . . . The co mmunity  . . . [is  the] final
tribu nal which decides whether anyt hing s hall  be language or not" (1 979: 1 4 9-5 0) . This  pos ition i s
held by Gauchat (1 905 , Wei nreich et al.  1 96 8) and Sapi r, in his di scu s sio n of drift (1 92 1 , Ferguson
1 996) . Further elaboratio n by his torical linguis t s is  slow ar riving. Even in 1 960 Mart inet , observi ng
that "We mu st  firs t of all attem pt  to define the not ion of a linguis tic com munit y, if such a thing is
po ss ible" (1 96 4: 1 36) , does  so m ini malty. He not es variat ion within varieties , and alternatio n between
them , bu t affir ms  st raightforward ext ens ion of a language to a set of speakers: "Human beings who
belong to o ne or  more lingui st ic co mmunities  . . .  use one or the other language according to the
person addres sed" (1 96 4: 1 3 9) .
1 . Definition . An act of speech is an utterance. 2. Assumption. Within certain communities successive utterances are alike or partly alike . . . 3 . Definition. Any such
community is a speech community.
(Bloomf ield 1 92 6: 1 5 3 - 4).
This formulation  highlights  the problem of linguistic uniformity (how alike must  utterances  be, and in
what ways, to constitute their  speakers as  sharing a speech community?), smuggling in "community"
as an unquestioned prime-two  problems  that remain with us. A later, widely-read version emphasizes
that intelligibility governs  the boundaries of SpComs-though  since this is a continuum, "the term
speech-community has  only a relative value" (Bloomfield 1 93 3:  5 4) . By this cr iterion , "speech-
co mmu ni ties differ greatly in  s ize" (1 9 3 3: 43) , while bili nguals  belong t o disparate com munit ies.
8100 mfi eld also not es variat ion within  si ngle communities  on geographic and social axes. He thus
touches  on problems  of scale, overlapping communities, and normative  heterogeneity.
Crucially, he explains both i nter nal variation and external  boundaries by interactional networks: "a
speech-community is a group of people who interact by means of s peech" (Bloomfield 1 93 3: 42) .
Gumperz attri bu tes t hi s t o s truct uralis t awarenes s  of dialect geography findi ng s: "By t he mid 1 9 3 Os  . . .
language change could thus  be explained as a direct function of the amount  and intensity of verbal
int eract ion among s peakers" (1 972: 2 3 ; bu t  see Milroy and Milroy 1 998) .  In t hi s view, "differences of
speech wit hin a co mmu ni ty are due to dif ferences in densi ty of co mmu nication" (Bloom field 1 9 33:
46), while "sub- grou ps are  separated by lines of weakness in this  net of oral com mu nication" (1 93 3:
47) . He i ncludes  social classes , age- groups , and occu pat ions ; i ndeed t he chapter , entit led "Speech-
Communities," is es sent tally a survey of extra-linguis tic correlat ions . The di scu ss io n is  prim itive
co mpared t o later sociolinguis t s ' use of social  networ k t heory (beginning perhaps wi th Fis hman
1 971 a); and social feat ures are largely discounted as influences  on linguistic  structure, as issues  of
linguis tic relativity are  subsequent ly sup pres sed by universalis t s (Gumperz and Levinson 1 996) . Yet
8100 mfield's emphas is  on i nt eract ion , and his  sugges tion t hat i t s impact  might  be quantif ied,
import antly prefigure wor k by Gu mperz and the Milroys . The idea that  networ ks are neut rat and
mechanical i n effect remains crit ical .
In the early 1 9605 , sociolingui st s elabor at ed t he S pCom. Clas s ic defini tio ns were  s till bei ng offered-
"all the peo ple who use a given language (or dialect)" (Lyons 1 970: 3 2 6)- bu t Gu mperz in 1 96 2 located
the problem: "While the anthropologist's description refers to specific communities, the universe of
linguistic analysis is a single language or dialect, a body of verbal  signs abstracted from the totality of
communicative behavior" (1972: 460). From the latter  position many problems  of language use are
inaccessible; Gumperz was interested, among others, in language choice and code  switching in
multili ngual  setti ng s . Wei nreich (1 95 3) , bridging the gap between structural and functional
approaches, introduced the notion of "bilingual  speech community" in opposition to extensions of the
classic  position, such as Mackey's: 
An individual's use of two languages  supposes the existence of two different language
communities; it does not suppose the existence of a bilingual community. The bilingual
community can only be regarded as a dependent collection of individuals who have
reasons for being bilingual.
(Mac key 1 9 72 : 5 5 4)
Gumperz, reformulating the SpCom "as a social group which may be either monolingual or
multilingual," adopts "the term  _linguistic community' by analogy with Emeneau's  term _linguistic
area'" (1 972 : 46 3)- point ing to wor k which demons trated that  s octal contact leads t o extens ive
st ructu rat  parallels  acros s t he bou ndaries  no t only of i ndividual languages, but  of language families
(Emeneau 1 956) . However , Gu m perz clearly did no t intend to im ply t he tr adit tonal conce pt was
adequate; in 1 96 8 he revi sed the not ion but retur ned t o the term S pCom .
His  approach is explicitly functional: "The criterion for inclusion of a code in a study of a linguistic
community is  that its exclusion will produce a gap i n the co mmu nicat ion matrix" (1 972: 46 4) .  In t his
spirit he facilitates  the t axonomic enter pri se , recom mending a t ypology of relat ionships "between the 
overall characteristics of the code matrix and certain features of social structure" (1972: 465), and
developing a terminology (largely abandoned) to allow more general formulations.
Gumperz' initial version of SpCom closely follows  Bloomfield (1933) in its  focus  on the frequency of
social int eract ion .  Int eres tingly, Hy mes lat er insi st s t hat frequency is not enough . Rather , he claim s
(citing Gu mperz' own finding s) , the "definit ion of situations in which , and identi ties  through which,
int eract ion occurs is deci sive" (1 974: 4 7) . I nit tally Gu mperz, Ii ke Bloom field , leaves o pen ques tions  of
scale: lingu is tic  com mu nit ies " may cons is t of s mall g rou ps bou nd toget her by face-to-face cont act  or
may cover large regions , de pendi ng on t he level of abs tr act ion we Wis h t o achieve" (Gumperz  1 972:
46 3) . No te  hi s i mplication that  s octal cohesion i s opt tonal ; Hymes wil I not allow that "ident ity, or
co mmonalit y, of Ii nguis t ic knowledge" is  sufficient t o unify members  of a co mmunity (1 974: 4 7) .
In the 1 96 8 revis ion, Gu mperz introduces two element s  absent fro m the previou s definit ion (which
de pended enti rely on social criteria) .  Bot h are  shared with Labov and Hymes, and enormously
influential in subsequent conceptions. He defines  the SpCom as "any human aggregate characterized
by regular  and frequent interaction by means  of a shared body of verbal signs  and  set  off from similar
aggregates  by significant differences in language usage" (1968:  381). This "shared body" reintroduces
common linguistic knowledge as  a necessary criterion. He adds  that "speech varieties  employed within
a s peech community form a syst em becau se t hey are relat ed to a s hared set of social nor ms" (1 96 8:
382); such normative regulat ion is  al so at  the  heart of Labov's  conception.
This  pair  of criteria alone  satisfies many sociolinguists as an all-purpose definition. For Fishman
(1971b: 28), a SpCom is a subtype of community "all of whose members  share at least a single  speech
variety and the nor ms  for it s appropriat e u se ." Ec kert and McConnell-Ginet (1 998: 4 90) claim that
though Ii p- service is u sually paid to a Rules+ Norm s model (ironically credit ed to Gum perz 1 982) ,
sociolinguis t s "seldom recognize explici fly t he crucial role of pract ice in delineat ing  s peech
co mmunities"   In such characterizations  the interactional criterion is  omitted. Fishman and many
others  reduce the Rules component to a minimum collective competence in grammatical knowledge.
Kerswill (1 994) , viewing Gu mperz' larger body of work, proposes a more complex interpretation of
this "shared body." He believes it refers not only to "linguistic  similarities among the various  codes in
use", but also to "agreement  on the  social meaning of various linguis t ic paramet ers" (1 994:  2 4) ,
including  sociolingui st ic variables , code switching , and co nt extualization cues; such parameters  can
only be fully understood by members of the same SpCom. However, I  separate  shared grammatical
competence as a criterion from organization and interpretation of sociolinguistic norms.
Gum perz' revi sion (1 982) expres ses ideas s hared wi th Hymes and Labov:
A SpCom is defined in functionalist  terms as a system of organized diversity held
together by common norm s and as pirations  . . . Member s of such a community typically
vary wit h res pect  to cert ain beliefs and ot her as pect s of behavior . Such variat ion , which
seem s irregular when observed at the level of the individual, nonetheless shows
systematic regularities at the  statistical level of social facts.
(Gum perz 1 9 82: 2 4).
This definition sympathetically assimilates Labov's work into a broader  social framework. Yet
Gumperz  makes  clear that  he is  more interested in exploring how interaction, including language,
constitutes social reality.  From this  perspective  he  seriously questions  the applicability of the SpCom
conce pt (1 982:  2 6) .
Classic definitions conceived of it as a "linguistic distribution within a social or geographical
space" (Gum perz 1 972: 46 3) ; some cu rrent models  require "a geogr aphical area delimited by non-
linguis tic criteria, such as demography or  socio- polit ical boundaries" (Kerswill 1 994: 2 3) . Dialect
geography and anthropology, too, have often assumed that  the most local and insular  units are
so mehow the pu res t and  st ronges t , t hu s t he canonical com munity . But Gumperz ci tes a worldwide
weakening of social boundaries and deference to group norms, drawing attention to the processes by
which individuals index identity. This  requires a renewed focus on face-to-face interaction,
ethnographic observation, and a consequent restriction to small-scale  studies. 
In effect  he first confines the s peech community t o quant itative, correlational work-rejecting the broad concept ion
sought in earlier approaches-and t hen abandons (though does not dismiss) it as a research focus.
This move is influential in current debates, where the divorce of the correlational and indexing
enterprises assumes an appearance of historical inevitability.
That, however, is not Gumperz' current perspective. As part of a rejuvenated linguistic anthropological
interest in social indexicality, he maintains his interest in face-to-face interaction:
If meaning  resides in interpret ive practices  . . . located in the social networks one is
socialized in, then the "culture-" and "language-" bearing units are not nations, ethnic
grou ps or t he Ii ke  . . .  but rat her networ ks of int eracting individuals .
(Gum perz and Levinson 1 996: 1 1 ).
Such networks may "cross-cut linguistic  and social boundaries of all sorts, creating regional and even
global patterns of shared, similar communicative st rategies  in s pecialist networ ks" (1 996: 1 2) .  In
order to locate both local and extended networks, and to grapple with supra-local problems  such as
standard language ideologies, a familiar larger entity is required: "Speech communities, broadly
conceived, can be regarded as collectivities of social  networ ks" (Gum perz 1 996: 36 2) . I n this view, the
rehabilit ated S pCom is not an abstract nexus of category lines, but instead is composed of network
building- blocks  in which "interpret ive st rategies are embedded  . . . and passed on as shared
communicative traditions." The difficulty with studying social meaning above the network level is that
"indexicality reflect[s] network-specific  practices" while SpComs "tend towards diversification and this
restricts the extent to which linguistic forms, conceptual  structures, and culture are shared" (1996:
363). Thus a notion of SpCom persists, but not one which presumes or  requires unity of norms  and
ways of speaking. This notion inhabits an upper region of the scale, and must allow for nesting and
interlocking network patterns.
This extended discussion of Gumperz' approaches to the SpCom has  served to introduce many
themes still current and problematic. One might  have done the same via other theorists; Gumperz is
convenient because his definitions are clear and easily dated in their progress, not subsumed early on
into a theoretical or methodological apparatus which promotes other concepts  as more basic-as with
Hymes  and Labov. Consideration of their competing and complementary approaches will be
contrastive as much as  historical, but the progressive focusing of Gumperz' views raises a key
question: has the SpCom become restricted to certain (possibly incompatible) paradigms of sociolin-
guistics, or is a broad conception still viable? (Though indeed the idea began in particular contexts,
early efforts  all tended towards generalization.)
Dell Hymes has always maintained a broad notion of the SpCom, rooted in his understanding of the
sociolinguistic enterprise:
Speech community is a necessary, primary conce pt  . . . It postulates the unit of
description as  a social, rather than linguistic, entity. One starts with a social group and
considers the entire organization of linguistic means within it .
(Hymes 1974: 47).
In many respects Hymes and Gumperz  agree: in shifting the classical focus from varieties to the
relations among speakers, discarding on functional  grounds the restriction to monolingual situations,
promoting sociolinguistic taxonomy, and insisting on both shared grammar  and shared norms. Where
Gumperz' descriptions start from individuals (like social network theory and the community of
practice approach), emphasizing speaker agency, boundary shifting and emergent meaning,
ethnography of communication began with a concern for collective resources, bounded events, and
ritual performance, privileging community and structure-it focused on social meaning, but was not
speaker-based.
In Hymes's theorizing, the nature of the SpCom is inferred from more basic terms: "The starting point of description is  . . .  a repertoire of ways of s peaking . . .  a speech community defined through the
concu rence of rules of grammar and rules of use" CHymes  I 974:  I 20) . It i s not a methodological
prime: one cannot know what practices are critical, or who shares in them, before a study has been
carried out . Communicative competence, ways of speaking (especially) and verbal repertoire are
principal term s . (Privileging context s and institutions as a vantage point yields an alternative, more
abstract approach, "the study of the speech economy of a community" C I 974: 46) , pursued by Gal
I 989, Irvine  I 989, Silverstein  I 996, among others.) An ideal ethnographer of speaking identifies a
verbal repertoire, catalogues speech events and rules of communicative practice, and describes what
communicative competence consists of: the SpCom can then be defined as the set of speakers who
appropriately exploit these resources. As in the classic definition, SpCom members are an identifiable
existing group located and bounded by shared knowledge-though Hymes stresses  social knowledge
of language functions and norms.
Knowledge of ways of speaking, and ability, are unequally distributed within a community, however,
raising the problem of how much knowledge is required (Dorian  I 982) , while knowledge alone is  not
sufficient to distinguish members  from mere participants  Ce.g. experienced fieldworkers), as Hymes
acknowledges  C I 974:  5 0- I ) . He allows wholly non-linguis tic crit eria here, such as birthright,
remindi ng us that hi s conce pt ion presu mes a cohesive ent ity, not jus t a set of i nt eract ing  s peakers-a
st ricter requirement than Gu mperz' loose interactional  collectivity. Thu s Hymes's "socially const ituted
linguistics" C I 974:  I 96) looks  to social material to constrain the ways in which language is
encountered empirically. His SpCom is a socially-based unit of linguistic analysis, and he explicitly
warns that sociolinguistics "requires the contribution of social  science in characterising the notions of
community, and of membership"  Pending this  solution, however, he follows early Gumperz in
specifying "a local  unit, characterised for its members by common locality and primary
int eract ion" C I 974:  5 I ) .
Yet from the  start, Hymes's approach emphasizes shared norms over interaction. He restates
Bloomfield's fundamental principle of linguistic theory: "in a speech community some utterances are
the  same," in terms of normative information derived from speech events: "in a speech community,
so me ways of s peaking are the  same" C I 974: 2 0 I ) . Way s of speaki ng imply knowledge not only of
forms and their co-occurrence, but also their social  distribution and appropriacy for social function.
The uniformity problem thus  shifts its focus from linguistic production to community-based
interpretation.
There are obviou s links to Labov's  C I 966) concept ion , perhaps the firs t t o cou ple productive and
evaluative norm s. Both place value on describing normative behavior, as displayed consciously and
unconsciously by speakers. It has proven more difficult to grasp how norms develop and change, are
acquired and understood-but this is a question which interaction-based analysis must also answer.
Language socialization theory COchs  I 996) addresses this , and practice theorist s CEc kert 2 000 ,
Meyerhoff , t his volume) have begun to explore it, both from anthropological traditions. More
sociologically-inclined adherents of network theory, such as the Milroys, say little about local  norms
at this level, despite crucial contributions to modeling networks as channels  for linguistic change
(often styled "mechanisms" for norm enforcement) and "prerequisite[s]  for a focused set of distinctive
vernacular norms" CMilroy and Milroy I 998:  I 88) . Their point that networ ks are a neut rat, relative
st ructural concept C I 998:  I 93) indicat es t he need for companion s tudies of linguis tic ideology t o
ex plore the values being transm itt ed across weak or  s trong ties .
Hymes's model  supports multiple varieties, like Gumperz', and insists  on shared form in addition to
shared ways  of speaking, unlike many later definitions privileging the latter (Romaine  I 994: 22,
Fasold  I 990: 4 I , Tras k  I 997: 2 04) . That the two may diverge is  usefully captured in the Sprachbund  /
Sprechbund distinction CNeustupny  I 978)-areal terms defined on just these grounds-but  a SpCom
must be located in the union of the two CHymes  I 974:  50 gives a more precise account). Orientation
to linguistic uniformity is often a dividing line for theorists: where later Gumperz downplays it, radical
su bjectivi st s deny it (Corder  I 973, Hudson  I 996) and variationists  privilege it CLabov's "uniform
st ructural base"  I 989:  2, Kerswill  I 994, Kroch  I 996). Hymes, like Labov, holds a nuanced view,
interpreting uniformity as an abstract regularity, not equivalent to identity of forms. Recognizing that
language use may constitute  social relationships, he suggests  that a scale of distinctiveness  be left
open: "Part of the creativity of users  of language lies in the freedom to determine what and how much
linguistic difference matters" (Hymes 1974: 123) to boundary maintenance.
William Labov's SpCom conception has been enormously influential. It is more empirically-rooted, less
generalized, than Hymes's or Gumperz'. It emerges in the course of a well-defined program of
research on language structure and change, rather than in the context  of sociolinguistic theorizing.
Consider three aspects.

1 It is closely based on results from a series of urban studies which established goals for later
researchers; its outlines emerge from a particular set  of questions and answers, and may be
inappropriate for others.
2  More than other theorists, Labov makes explicit  and testable his conceptions of linguistic
uniformity and normative  sociolinguistic  structure, which have been widely adopted and
debated.
3 It is allied to a rich array of methods, also commonly used-often by researchers with
diverging assumptions and objectives.
Labov's definition was the first to posit both shared norms and linguistic uniformity (as  structured
variation), in that order, as criteria for identifying a SpCom. While Romaine and others incorrectly
charged that in Labov's conception of uniformity, SpCom members "share rules of grammar in the
form of variable rules" (Ro maine 1 982 : 1 9) , the var table rule (Labov 1 96 9) is  not hi s solution t o the
problem. (Romai ne her self ad mi t s it is  peri pher al to the SpCo m: "t he thrus t of my argument i s against
the s pecific descri pt ive device , the variable rule ," (1 982 : 2 3); but  the m isunder st anding persis t s , e . g .
Kerswill  1 994: 1 3 7.) Inst ead this is handled through the earlier invention of the linguistic variable
(Labov 1 966: 32ff) , a set of variant s which is s pecifiable inde pendent of any predict ability by linguistic
conditioning , and capable of crossing phonemic or morphemic lines. The normal heterogeneity
characteristic of speech production is expressed as differential use of variants, but the SpCom is
"defined on the level of interpretation; the obverse of heterogeneous speech production is
homogeneit y in the inter pretation of the variant s" (Ro maine 1 982 : 1 8) . Thu s unifor mity and
int er pretation are inseparable .
Subsequently, the importance of linguistic uniformity for Labov is highlighted: matching the complex
dis t ribut ion of sho rt- a in Philadelphia (Labov 1 9 89) is  prima facie evidence for membership. But it is
the  normative criterion that has vexed cri tics . Since many later consideratio ns focu s on the 1 96 3- 4
New Yor k Cit y st udy as t hough re present ative of cu rrent Labovian practice , discussion of his
co nt ribut ion to t he SpCo m is also concentrated here . It mu st  be bor ne in mind, however , t hat what
Labov prescribed were analyt ical and int er pretive practices-not out co mes in t he  sense that
su bsequent s peech co mmunities  should resemble New York's .
Labov's SpCom model is the direct product of his  survey of the Lower East Side (LES)  neighborhood of
New York City. Here the SpCom definition was developed; from here it was generalized, by Labov and
others. This  study's goal was "to investigate the structure of NYC English" (Labov 1 966: 1 1 0) .
Understand! ng the social distribut ion of linguistic forms , and exploring their social meaning-the
correlation and indexicality problems which constitute dominant interests in sociolinguistics today-
proved necessary, but subsidiary. Many later criticisms of the SpCom come from researchers  primarily
concerned with these issues, especially indexing (e.g. Eckert), or even with no interest in linguistic
structure (e.g. Bucholtz).
For Labov, the constituency of a SpCom must be discovered through the research process. It is an
out come , no t an assum pt ion; a matter for observation , no t theory (Labov 1 994: 4- 5) . He breaks
cleanly wit h classic definit ions t hat endow a gr oup of s peakers wi th social coherence, warning
sociolinguis t s to "avoid any error which would arise in assuming that a group of people who speak
alike is a fundamental unit of social behavior" on the grounds that "asking about the language
charact eristics of a social g rou p  . . .  seems more fundament al and more closely tied to the genesis of
lingu istic differentiat ion" (Labov 1 966: 1 3 6 -7). This approach avoids cir cu larit y o n t he assum pt ion ,
shared with Hymes , that social unit s can be clearly ident ified on non- lingu istic criteria-a point
challenged explicit ly by Gu m perz , who considered t hat bot h social and Ii ngui st ic cat egories are
"signal|ed and su bject t o change in response t o simi lar for ces" , as ki ng "How can one set  of categories
be used to establish an objective basis against which to evaluate the other?"
(Labov 1 9 82 : 2 9) . It is therefore critical that Labov not focus (as he does not) on how language as a semiotic resource is
manipulated to constitute social identity.
Labov's met hod in New Yor k was to delimit a sample first by applying  social criteria, then by raising
issues of competence via acquisition patterns (excluding non-native  speakers of English, and of NYC
English), and finally by analysis of linguistic structure (e.g. the ultimate  separation of African-
American  speakers on phonological grounds). The notion of community guiding the LES  survey was
primarily defined not by interaction, shared norms, or social stratification, but residence. The LES was
selected because (1) the city's main social classes and ethnic groups were well represented; (2) it was
a focus for both social mobility and local loyalty; (3) as a former port of entry, the influence of
immigrant groups could be tested; and (4) residential structure was typical of the city and allowed for
interaction between social groups. There was  no requirement of strong  social bonds or coherence
(even hi s 1 989 definit ion begins "an aggregat e of s peakers": Labov 1 989: 2) . No lingui st ic criteria
were applied .
As the emphasis was on results of dialect  acquisition, convergence, focusing, and transmission,
interaction was important for the resulting  system's nature. Yet Labov's interest was  not in the
diversity of ways of  speech produced by interaction within particular networks (like Gumperz), but
rather the consequent uniformity across a larger  collectivity. New Yor k City turned out to show a
surprising degree of convergent behavior, reflected in Labov's  statement: "NYC is a single  speech
community, united by a common set of evaluative norms, though divergent in the application of these
nor ms" (Labov 1 966: 3 5 5 ; not e, however, t he las t clause) .
This  normative regularity is an empirical finding. The claim rests  primarily on the evidence of
synchronic  style-shifting patterns, supported by covert and overt measures of evaluative norms
(subjective reaction, self-evaluation, and linguistic-insecurity tests, plus  language-attitude
interviews). Results recurred strikingly across  social classes, the  sexes, age, and ethnic groups;
irregularities were minor, largely mirroring changes in progress or contrasting changes of a different
age. The tests were conceived and interpreted in the light of a model of social stratification which has
been much criticized (discussed below). Only the  subjective-reaction test implicated  such a model in
its administration, however, and the overall convergence of Labov's findings has never  been
challenged (Sant a Ana and Parodi 1 998) . The charact er of t his  s pecific case under gi rds the general
defi nit ion of the SpCo m in his  later synthesis:
The speech community is  not defined by any marked agreement in the use of language
elements, so much as by participation in a set of shared norms. These norms may be
observed in overt types of evaluative behavior, and by the uniformity of abstract
patterns of variation which are invariant in respect to particular levels of usage.
(Labov 1 972 : 1 20-1 ).
Several points require emphasis because of frequent misinterpretations. The norms are not limited to
evaluation or ideology (contra Fasold  1 9 84: 1 4 8, Bucholtz 1 999: 2 0 8) bu t include quant itative
patt ems of  production showing s tructu red variation. Generalizations abou t such norm s are thus  not
merely inter pret ive  st atement s filt ered t hrough t he analys t's  preferred model of society. Labov's first
as sertion t hat "New Yor k for ms a single  s peech community" occu rs (1 966: 2 02) before evaluative data
have even been introduced. Crucially, Labov's  conception requires  reference to a set  of shared norms-
not deference or uniform adherence. He repeatedly describes departures  from the overall patterns, by
individuals and subgroups, which do not falsify the existence of these norms. This is  consistent with
the definition given above, allowing for "divergence in application."
It has been charged that Labov's model specifies rigid allegiance to sociolin-gutstic  norms. Milroy
wonders, "Why should we  suppose that individuals at different social levels make the  same  social
evaluations?" (1 982 : 46) . Kerswill sugges t s that "Labov's model  . . .  seem s bli ndly consensus-based and
does not allow for multiple norms" (1994: 27). Bucholtz refers to "the expectation of consensus in
speech community norms" as "the problem of homogeneity in the  speech community model" (1999:
209), brashly conflating Labov's conception with that of Bloomfield and Hymes. Milroy and Milroy
attribute to Labov the claim that "every speaker agrees on the evaluation of the varying norms of 
language" (1997:  53). Milroy even argues that given "t he doctrine of common evaluat ion . . . it is
dif ficult to see how socially motivated linguistic change can take place" (Milroy 1 982: 38) . The word
"consensu s" reverberates acros s t hese analyses , which unconsciously echo t he variat ionis t critique of
categorical  st ruct urali st linguistics (Weinreich et al.  1968).
These criticisms, however, fail to distinguish the analyst's view of social structure from
generalizations about dominant  sociolinguistic patt ems of production and evaluat ion . (Labov (1 966)
clearly se parates them, and non-circularly orders the two.) Though framed as objections to the
SpCom model, they are actually objections to the "consensus" view of society the LES study adopted.
They also appear to  suggest that surveys following Labovian methods lead, through expectations and
prejudgments, to predetermined results. Thus they not only make a mild, plausible claim-that the
consensual sociolinguistic patterns found in 1960's NYC are a narrow basis for a general SpCom
model-but a more serious one: that Labov's social-theory assumptions led to wrong conclusions
about NYC speech and generally render his model inadequate.
Yet no evidence for exceptionless norms exists  in the LES survey itself. Labov repeatedly noted
divergence, both in production and evaluation. A striking individual example is Steve K, who
"consciously tr ied t o reverse hi s college- trained tendency t owards formal speech, and . . . deliberately
rejected the patt ern of values reflected" in t he s peech of ot her LES individual s (Labov 1 966: 80) .
Des pite this reject ion , Steve K was unable to significantly differentiate himself in test speech. The
method clearly does not preclude opposing values, then; in NYC they simply appeared to be
exceptional, or to have insignificant consequences for  speech production. This underlies Labov's dual
stress on evaluative behavior and patterns of variation: attitude differences unaccompanied by speech
differences are epiphenomena.
When a significant group of speakers differs on both levels, however, the model treats them as a
distinct speech community. This is the case of the African-Americans examined separately: "Negro
speakers  share t he white att itudes towards correctness  . . .  [but] rever se whit e attit udes t owards the
cultural values of NYC s peech" (Labov 1 966: 3 5 2) . "The use of (eh) , (oh) , Cay) and (aw) by Negro
speakers  is quite different than for whites" (1966: 370). Differences of class and age among black
speakers are noted, too, but overall they are consistently distinguished on many grounds from the
white ethnic groups, who pattern together. Again, Labov noted "the resistance of children to the
middle-class norm" (1966: 348), and argued that "many lower class subjects fall outside the influence
of the unifying nor ms  . . . many seem to lac k the cultural values which maintain the working class
pattern of speech in opposition to massive pressure from above" (Labov 1 966: 3 51) .
On close examination, it is clear that  this seminal study, like many subsequent ones  influenced by it ,
recognized rather than suppres sed diverse patt ems of evaluation and product ion in t he com munit y
examined. The t hru s t of Labov's "unifying norm" was not t o paint , or prescribe, uniform ity, but t o
st ress t he pressu re of standard linguis t ic nor ms that were acce pted more t han resi st ed. It  is t rue t hat
Labov does not formal ly raise the resis t ance observed to t he level of co mpeting nor ms and reify it  in a
"conflict" model; neither  is it obvious that  this would be a correct analysis of his data. Finally, the
study identified several levels of generalization-local unity, patterns of divergence that nevertheless
refer to local norms, and shared acceptance of external norms by members of different SpComs
(blac k and whi te New Yor kers)- point ing to the need for a "nested" SpCom model.

3. The Speech Community and Models of Society.
To the extent that the normative organization of a SpCom is discovered through empirical research, it
can clearly be distinguished from the socioeconomic structure of the society to which that SpCom
belongs. Standard procedure in sociolinguistic  surveys requires consulting existing social science and
historical research to understand the makeup of a community and inform the use of social variables
as explanatory factors for language variation and change.
In this approach, analyses of social structure and linguistic behavior must be kept separate so the
former may have explanatory value for the latter: "The nature of these [speech] norms, especially
whether they relate to standard, legitimized, and literate forms of language, is determined by larger
socioeconomic structures, in particular those based on power" (Ker swill 1 994: 2 7). As noted ,
Gumperz' challenge to t his result s  in an opposed set of research concerns, called "interpretive 
sociolinguistics" by LePage (1 997): "wor k which st art s from  the observation of linguistic behavior and
interprets it in terms of social meaning, rather  than starting from social structure and looking for
linguistic correlates" (1997: 31).
Recently it  has been argued within the correlational paradigm, as well, that the two levels cannot be
separated. To the Milroys, "Labov's key sociolinguistic  notion of speech community seems to assume
a consensus model of social class whereby the community is fundamentally cohesive", while applying
such a model to the speakers they studied requires analyzing the Belfast vernacular "as an
unsuccessfu I ap pro ximat ion to educated  . . .  or standard English varlet ies" (Milroy and Milroy 1 998:
1 80-1) . Yet  if "ver nacular maint enance can resu It in conf lict between two o p po si ng norms ," one
st andard and one low-prestige , then vernacu lar s peakers do not  share a common set of (evaluative)
nor ms with standard speaker s: "The pattern arisi ng  is  . . .  one of conf lict rather than consensus" (Milroy
and Milroy 1 997:  5 3) . (Here they fol low Ric kford  1 986 , who describes a Guyanese Creole-speaking
community where opposed sets of attitudes aligned with distinct patterns of variation.) They argue
that "a social class model based on conflict, division and inequality can account  better than one based
on consensus for many patterns of language variation" (Milroy and Milroy 1 998: 1 81) .
The latter point  is persuasive; but  the  isomorphy proposed for the two levels of social organization is
not . The type of evidence cited from Belfast  to support  the Milroy's view is also found in NYC, as
shown above, if to a different degree. Yet neither conflict nor consensus models can be preferred in
the abstract; as social analyses they are more or less applicable  in specific  situations. Choice is related
to scale factors: higher points on the population scale may be more  heterogeneous and divided.
Delimitation of SpCom boundaries  is also critical.  In Dorian (1 981 ) , focu s on t he com pet ence of
Gaelic -s peaking fisherfol k alone lends itself t o a consensu s model, while  including t he att itudes of
Engli sh monolinguals  in the same villages might  be better  handled in a conflict  approach. In NYC,
Labov's exclusion of certain native and immigrant groups  is related to  his concentration on the
linguistic  system. The legitimacy of analytical choices thus depends upon selection of the research
question, in addition to the site.
If such models are intended to help elucidate  sociolinguistic patterns, they must be defined
independently. An approach should be  adopted not  based on the results of subjective evaluation or
matched-guise tests, but  because broader patterns of social, economic, historical, and cultural
organization make it compelling. To contend that  conflict models are generally preferable because of
sociolinguistic findings, and then use the former to  interpret the latter, is circular. Further, the claim
that a social model binds the linguist  to a particular view of t he varieties u nder s tudy-t hat u nder a
co nsensu s model, New Yor kers mu st  fail in  spea ki ng Standard Eng lish , while i n a conf lict model they
successful ly maintain a low- presti ge variety-is  Sim ply fal se . It does  not reflect usual practice among
sociolinguists, which is to  recognize the  hegemonic character of standard languages while
considering structurally distinct varieties to have their own integrity.
The introduction of conflict models  has benefited correlational studies in several ways. It draws
attention to the choices open to analysts and their impact. It raises the question: does recognition of
competing norms within a SpCom invalidate emphasis on overarching norms as a definitional
criterion? Undoubtedly, conflict models  suit some social situations better (e.g. post-plantation
Caribbean societies wit h characteristically str ong racial and class  ant agonis ms) . They are not
panaceas , however , t o be universally preferred . They carry no explanations with them-but  there are
caveats. It is easily overlooked that in the absence of a broad societal consensus on values,
st ratificat ion may st ill be powerful. Conf lict analyst s (Ric kford  1 986 , Milroy and Milroy 1 998) typically
assig n op posed groups each t o a set  of normat ive values , so that di scord occu rs between relatively
homogeneous fact ions . Rea|it y is often more co mplicated , wit h individuals  holdi ng conflicting values ,
each ratified by society (Patrick 1 999) ; but  individual agency i s not easily captured in theories derived
from Marx.
Finally, the connection between models of society and characterizations of the SpCom is not
trans parent , des pite claims in the literat ure . Inter pret ing SpCo m models prim arily through the lens of
social class is unnecessarily restrictive. Whether one privileges structural uniformity and stresses the
institu-tionalization of power in shared attitudes towards a standard (regarding dissent as minimal
and covert)-or privileges acts of identity and focuses on speaker agency in social positioning through
linguistic choice, celebrating diverse attitudes-are to some extent predilections of the analyst that do.

No hay comentarios.:

Publicar un comentario